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Owen Fiss* TREBILCOCK’S HERESY†
Michael Trebilcock is passionately committed to improving the lives of the poor. As
part of this project, he has written extensively on the effort to bolster the rule of law
in developing countries and to improve the legal institutions found in these countries.
Through an analysis of his recent book on this subject, Rule of Law Reform and
Development (written with Ron Daniels), this essay examines Trebilcock’s method
and philosophic orientation and shows how his moral sensibilities have led him to
depart from the classic tenets of law and economics and to open new vistas for this
branch of legal analysis.
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The year 2008 was a terrible one for the market, both as an idea and as a
concrete institution. First there was the global financial crisis, which not
only caused great suffering but also cast doubt on the self-regulatory
capacity of the market. Then came the publication of Michael
Trebilcock and Ron Daniels’ book Rule of Law Reform and Development,1
which, given the occasion and given Ron’s success in scaling the
heights and acquiring that immunity from criticism known as the presi-
dential prerogative, I will attribute entirely to Michael.
As a theoretical construct, the market makes free and open exchange
the primary ordering mechanism of society. It presupposes that people
are driven by the rational pursuit of self-interest under conditions of scar-
city. It also relativizes all values by reducing them to preferences and
declaring that all preferences are equally worthy of satisfaction. Under
these assumptions, the social function of the market becomes one of
maximizing the satisfaction of preferences in a purely quantitative
sense – to increase the size of the pie – which, according to the
theory of comparative advantage, will be the inevitable result of trade
among free agents.
Exchange requires that property rights be clearly defined and pro-
tected and, furthermore, that contracts be enforced. Those who exalt
the market turn to the state to perform these functions and allow the
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state to intervene in those situations, presumably few in number, in which
the benefits and costs of an activity are not adequately reflected in private
bargains. In this way, the state is acknowledged, but only grudgingly.
Competition among economic actors, not the state, is supposed to be
the prime regulatory mechanism of aggressive pursuit of self-interest.
Beginning in the 1970s, market ideology achieved greater and greater
ascendancy, and reached its apotheosis during the political era marked by
the presidency of Ronald Reagan and the premiership of Margaret
Thatcher. The market then became the model of domestic policy in
the United States and the United Kingdom and, even more signifi-
cantly for our purposes, guided the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund in their development programs under the banner of
the Washington consensus.
As a result, loans to developing countries were conditioned upon their
willingness to institute a series of reforms or structural adjustments that
were dictated by market principles: privatization, deregulation, balanced
budgets, and free trade. These reforms were supposed to spur economic
growth, which was understood in purely quantitative terms and typically
measured by per-capita GDP. The premises underlying the market were
deemed to be universal truths, and thus no concessions were made for
local conditions, culture, or history. The Washington consensus consti-
tuted a universal prescription for all debtor nations.
Disenchantment with the Washington consensus began long before
Michael wrote his book. One strand of criticism emphasized the impor-
tance of institutions for development. This school of thought is best rep-
resented by the work of Douglass North2 and the 1999 manifesto of the
World Bank that ‘governance matters.’3 Michael’s subject is not insti-
tutions in general but, rather, legal institutions, and it is rooted in the
increasing emphasis on the rule of law in development circles during
the 1990s, perhaps occasioned by the collapse of the Soviet empire and
the prominent role American lawyers played in the transition process.4
The bulk of the book deals with the institutional apparatus of the
law – courts, police, prosecutors, prisons, tax administration (which is
treated as a stand-in for all administrative agencies), legal aid, law
schools, and bar associations.
In some societies, law schools operate independently of the state, and
Michael endorses this arrangement.5 Bar associations also sometimes
2 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990).
3 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, & Pablo Zoido-Loboto´n, Governance Matters, WPS2196
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999).
4 Thomas Carothers, ‘The Rule of Law Revival’ (1998) 77 Foreign Aff. 95.
5 Trebilcock & Daniels, Rule of Law, supra note 1 at 287.
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operate independently of the state, although here Michael’s proposed
reform moves in the opposite direction: he urges the establishment of
a single, unitary bar association in which membership by all lawyers is
mandatory.6
Aside from these two instances, the institutions that Michael wishes to
reform constitute the apparatus of the state, and although he makes
many proposals to change the way they operate, he does not propose
to confine them to the protection of property rights or the enforcement
of contracts. Michael is extraordinarily nimble in his use of the traditional
tools of law and economics, and he undoubtedly could, if pressed, justify
each of the state interventions he accepts as a strategy needed to correct
for market failure. Even so, the result, taken as a whole, would be striking.
Gone is the minimalist state envisioned by the market ideology and
required by the Washington consensus.
The goal or aim of Michael’s reform package is also distinctive and sets
him apart from those who defend the market and, for that matter, from
the new institutional economists, who stress the importance of institutions
but only for the purpose of promoting growth understood in classical
terms – increasing the size of the pie. Michael refuses to relativize all
values and, in keeping with the pioneering work of Amartya Sen,7 intro-
duces a non-material and egalitarian dimension to his conception of
the ends of development. For Michael, the aim of development is not
to increase per-capita GDP but, rather, to enlarge the opportunities for
self-realization of all citizens.8 Material resources are important for self-
realization, but so are civil and political rights and freedom in general.
Michael promotes adherence to the rule of law not as a way of enhancing
economic growth but, rather, as a means of creating a more humane and
decent society.
This can be seen most clearly when Michael is pressed to give an
account of what he means by the rule of law. Michael is the master of
the middle ground, and in defining the rule of law he tries to avoid
two familiar extremes – the view that maintains that the rule of law
requires the establishment of a just society (law as justice) and, alterna-
tively, the view that sees the rule of law as merely requiring transparent
and predictable enforcement of positive law (law as rules). In an effort
to locate this middle ground, Michael offers what he calls a procedural
conception of the rule of law. Offhand, it would seem that such a
conception of the rule of law veers toward the positivist extreme,
and so is consonant with market principles, but in fact Michael
defines the procedural conception of the rule of law in such a way as
6 Ibid. at 330.
7 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Knopf, 1999).
8 Trebilcock & Daniels, Rule of Law, supra note 1 at 27.
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to introduce – all to his credit – a robust set of moral considerations. He
calls these moral considerations ‘normative benchmarks,’ which he says
are to be justified by ‘the contribution they make to human development’
and ‘correlate with a minimal constellation of civil and political rights,
and a basic arrangement of economic facilities related to the protection
of property and constitutional rights.’9
The full import of Michael’s procedural conception of the rule of law
becomes apparent when we examine his concrete proposals for reform-
ing legal institutions. Some of these reforms are aimed at furthering
familiar process values – transparency, predictability, stability, and enfor-
ceability. These values fit comfortably within the parameters of what ordi-
narily might be considered a procedural conception of the rule of law
and, I imagine, would be fully endorsed by those who are dedicated to
market principles and have no grander ambition for the state than the
protection of property rights and the enforcement of contracts. Yet
these process values play only a secondary role in the design or construc-
tion of Michael’s reform package. The primary emphasis in the book is
on two other sets of values, what he calls institutional and legitimacy
values, and these are harder to reconcile with market principles or, for
that matter, with what might properly be called a procedural conception
of the rule of law.
The institutional values to which Michael refers are independence and
accountability. As Michael recognizes, in the case of some legal insti-
tutions it is difficult to imagine the relevance of these values. Do we
want prisons to be independent, and, if so, independent from what?
The state? Politics? Even where independence and accountability
appear to be relevant institutional virtues, as they do, for example, for
the judiciary, we can readily see that, in contrast to growth, they cannot
be simply maximized. The achievement of independence will necessarily
come at the expense of accountability, and vice versa.
Accordingly, Michael says, it is always necessary to find the right
balance of independence and accountability.10 However, to identify
the right balance of independence and accountability, these would-be
reformers must postulate another set of values, distinctly moral ones.
Some of these moral values, such as the requirement of fair trials or
due process, may be procedural in nature, but Michael does not
confine himself to such moral values. He also sometimes invokes substan-
tive moral values, such as those implicated in the protection of civil and
political rights, to identify the proper balance of independence and
accountability.
9 Ibid. at 25.
10 Ibid. at 30.
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Admittedly, as the master of the middle ground, Michael is reluctant to
endorse an understanding of the rule-of-law ideal that requires nothing
less than achieving a just society. At the theoretical level, he endorses
only ‘a minimal constellation of civil and political rights,’ but he offers
nothing other than the jurisprudence of Goldilocks – this is too much,
this is too little, this is just right – to prevent a slide to what he regards
as an extreme: the maximum constellation of civil and political rights,
or, even more, the protection of social and economic rights.
My inclination is not to criticize the introduction of moral values into
the rule-of-law reform program but, rather, to underscore their tension
with what may ordinarily be understood as a procedural conception of
the rule of law and, even more importantly, with market principles.
The moral values Michael introduces are alien to the world supposed
by market theory, where all values are reduced to preferences that have
an equal claim to be satisfied. Moreover, these values have no necessary
or even probabilistic relationship to growth understood in purely quanti-
tative terms. Some, such as the avoidance of corruption, may further
economic growth, but others, such as the protection of civil and political
rights, may push in the opposite direction, or may be pursued without
regard for growth.
In fact, Michael does not seem concerned about those situations in
which the pursuit of moral values may impede economic growth; or, at
least, he endorses arrangements that may cause one to wonder whether
they are conducive to economic growth. For example, he speaks warmly
of the reforms instituted in Costa Rica in 1989, when a new chamber –
Sala IV – was added to an already powerful and well-endowed Supreme
Court.11 Sala IV was charged with the mission of protecting fundamental
rights under both the national constitution and international law, and
it discharged this responsibility aggressively. Michael describes this devel-
opment approvingly, suggesting that the country had found the right
balance of independence and accountability and thus furthered the
rule of law; yet he reaches this conclusion without any concern, as far
as I can tell, for its impact on economic growth. He does not pause to
consider whether the spiralling caseload of Sala IV should be seen as an
indication that the 1989 reform may have in fact impeded growth.
Michael’s introduction of legitimacy values to define the goals he
hopes to achieve by his rule-of-law reforms also puts him at war with
market principles, maybe even more emphatically. According to
Michael, legitimacy requires that legal institutions gain the active
support of the populace – citizens must regard them as deserving their
obedience and respect.12 Of course, the action needed to engender
11 Ibid. at 74–5.
12 Ibid. at 33, n. 98.
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such respect varies from society to society and depends to a large extent
on the prevailing beliefs or values of that society.
Sometimes these beliefs may align with or even require economic
growth. One such example is Michael’s description of the 1992 police
reforms in El Salvador, where the populace’s desire to weed out corrup-
tion coincided with market principles.13 Yet it is equally plausible to
assume that in many cases, especially when these beliefs are rooted in reli-
gious traditions or theories of human rights, the adjustments needed for
legitimacy may retard or even conflict with economic growth. Programs to
improve prison conditions, warmly endorsed by Michael,14 might be such
an example. Educating prisoners might be a productive investment that
will have a big pay-off on their release, but other reforms, such as
measures to reduce overcrowding and the barbaric practices associated
with overcrowding, may have no discernible connection to growth, and
yet they may be endorsed by the populace and thus required in order
to maintain the legitimacy of the prison system.
Not only does the pursuit of legitimacy and institutional values intro-
duce moral considerations into Michael’s reform package that are
extraneous and sometimes antithetical to market principles, and that
cannot in all fairness be embraced within a procedural conception of
the rule of law, but the pursuit of these values requires Michael to dis-
tance himself from such theorists as Milton Friedman, who invoke the
authority of science in their defence of the market.15 According to
Friedman and others who follow his tradition,16 the scientific character
of economics, and of market theory in particular, arises from its capacity
to generate predictions about the world that can be empirically sup-
ported or tested in some way.
In the development context, those who invoke the authority of science
maintain that if the economies of developing countries are reformed to
comport with market principles – deregulation, privatization, free
trade, balanced budgets, and so on – then these economies will grow
(to some indeterminate degree). On this account, growth is assumed to
be the desired end, and the power of the market, seen as an instrument
for achieving that end, will be demonstrated by the result it produces.
Although the universality of the prescriptions of the Washington consen-
sus has been startling to many, and has been criticized on that ground
13 Ibid. at 121.
14 Ibid. at 199.
15 See, e.g., Milton Friedman, ‘The Methodology of Positive Economics’ in Milton
Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953) 3.
16 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 7th ed. (New York: Aspen, 2007).
See also Gerrit De Geest, ‘The Debate on the Scientific Status of Law and Economics’
(1996) 40 Europ.Econ.Rev. 999.
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(how can it be that “one size fits all”?), such universality accords with the
avowed scientific character of the model of human behaviour that is
assumed by the market and that gave rise to the consensus. All scientific
theories are universal.
Michael is a lawyer-economist of the very first order. Chicago was once
his training ground, and though he has an empirical bent, he does not
invoke the authority of science or offer any universal prescriptions. Nor
could he. Although he rightly insists that legal institutions must be seen
by the populace as legitimate, the policies needed to achieve legitimacy
depend vitally on the peculiar history of a society and the prevailing
beliefs and traditions of its citizens. Similarly, the pursuit of what
Michael calls ‘institutional values’ will be heavily context dependent.
The right balance of accountability and independence will vary from
society to society and from institution to institution.
Even more fundamentally, the inclusion of a robust set of moral values
in the goals or aims of Michael’s rule-of-law reform program is inconsist-
ent not only with Michael’s own description of his approach as procedu-
rally based but also with the scientific claims of economics, and of market
principles in particular. For example, in the pursuit of institutional values,
Michael argues that legal institutions should be reformed to reflect more
properly the appropriate balance of independence and accountability
that will, at the very same moment, enhance growth and further civil
and political rights. But only moral reflection, not the methods of
science, can tell us what should be the proper mix among these goals
(growth vs. civil and political rights) or how much one goal should be
sacrificed in order to further the other. Moreover, Michael’s central pre-
scription for the pursuit of institutional values – find the right balance of
independence and accountability – describes a wise judgement, not a
course of conduct that is observable and that could be deemed respon-
sible for producing discernible or measurable consequences. In fact,
the wisdom of that judgement will depend in large part on an assessment
of the goodness of the consequences that the judgement will produce.
None of this is to deny the merits of Michael’s proposed reforms of
legal institutions; in fact, many – maybe most, maybe all – seem extre-
mely appealing. Rather, it is to identify the very special brand of law
and economics that Michael practises, indeed pioneered, and that is
known the world over. For him, the market – exchange – is not an ideol-
ogy but, rather, a pragmatic instrument for achieving limited ends, one
that might, if used with care, be harnessed to serve the deeply humane
values that are the proper subject of moral reflection and that are at
the core of his being.
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